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After September 11
By C. Alan Garner
T
he terrorist attacks on September 11 dealt a serious blow to the
U.S. economy. The damage included the tragic loss of human
life, massive property destruction, and disruptions to the travel
and  shipping industries.  But immediately after the attacks, many
observers also worried about the possible harm to business and con-
sumer confidence. Although the effects on business confidence are hard
to measure, regular surveys of households make it easier to assess the
effects on consumer confidence. These surveys show that consumer con-
fidence was surprisingly resilient.
Faced with this resilience, forecasters and policymakers struggled to
interpret  the  movements  in  consumer  confidence.  Did  consumers
quickly return to more normal economic behavior even though they
were shocked by the terrorist attacks? Or was the resilience somehow
illusory? Were measures of consumer confidence actually lower than
would be  expected  based  on prevailing  economic  conditions?  The
answers to these questions might have implications about the economic
outlook or the proper settings for monetary and fiscal policy.
This article examines the impact of the terrorist attacks on con-
sumer confidence at the end of 2001. The first section describes the two
major measures of consumer confidence and summarizes their recent
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b e h a v i o r. The second section shows that consumer confidence indexes
typically produce small improvements, at best, in forecast accuracy. The
third section finds that the terrorist attacks did not cause a clear weak-
ening of consumer confidence after September 11. As a result, the con-
sumer confidence indexes maintained a fairly normal relationship to
other economic indicators and did not contain much new information
for forecasters and policymakers. The resilience of consumer confidence
may have offered some assurance, however, that the worst fears about
the economic outlook would not be realized.
I. MEASURES OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE
Analysts paid increased attention to the two major measures of con-
sumer confidence after September 11. The Conference Board’s index is
named the Consumer Confidence Index, while the University of Michi-
gan’s index is the Index of Consumer Sentiment. To minimize confu-
sion, this article will refer to these measures as the Conference Board
index and the Michigan index, using the term consumer confidence in a
more generic sense.  This section describes these two widely cited
indexes and summarizes their recent fluctuations.
Description of the indexes
The two major confidence indexes are broadly similar in design but
differ in many details. Both indexes reflect monthly surveys of U. S .
households. The Conference Board mails its survey to 5,000 households
each  month, receiving about 3,500 responses, whereas the  Survey
Research Center at the University of Michigan conducts a telephone sur-
vey of at least 500 households. Both organizations release their full sur-
vey results near the end of the month, putting these indexes among the
earliest indicators of monthly economic activity. The University of Michi-
gan also releases a preliminary value of its index near the middle of each
month, reflecting responses collected during the first part of the month.
Although both indexes focus on five main questions about current
and expected conditions as described in the box, the surveys differ in
how the questions are worded and the time periods for which house-
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Board index specifically reflects household views about job availability
and total family income, while only the Michigan survey inquires
whether it is a good time to buy major household items.1 The Confer-
ence Board asks questions about household expectations for the next six
months, while the University of Michigan requests household views
covering the next year or the next five years.
The Conference Board and the University of Michigan also produce
subindexes relating to current and expected economic conditions. Both
organizations combine responses to their two questions about the pres-
ent situation to produce current-conditions indexes. Likewise, the
organizations combine responses to their three questions about future
conditions to get expectations subindexes. Many analysts follow move-
ments in these subindexes, although the overall Conference Board and
Michigan indexes still get the most attention. Moreover, the expecta-
tions subindex from the Michigan survey is a component of the com-
posite index of leading indicators, a well-known index that may help to
predict economic fluctuations.
Recent developments
The Conference Board and Michigan indexes display clear cyclical
patterns over time. Chart 1 shows the two indexes from the first quarter
of 1967 to the first quarter of 2002, the longest period for which both
indexes are available.2 The shaded areas are recessions as defined by the
National Bureau of Economic Research.3 The Conference Board index
has fluctuated over a wider range than the Michigan index. As a rule of
thumb, a one-point move in the Michigan index is roughly comparable
to a two-point move in the Conference Board index (Bram and Ludvig-
son). The chart shows that the confidence indexes turned down sharply
before or during past recessions, and the indexes rebounded near the
end of the recession or early in the recovery period. However, some
moderately large and persistent declines in the confidence indexes were
not followed by a recession. For example, the Conference Board index
decreased gradually by 16 points from the second quarter of 1984 to
the fourth quarter of 1986 without a recession developing.4 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The recent declines in consumer confidence started from unusually
high levels. Both indexes were near their historical peaks from 1997
through most of 2000. On a quarterly basis, the Conference Board
index set an all-time high of 142.1 in the third quarter of 2000. The
Michigan index reached a record level of 110.1 in the first quarter of
2000 and remained near that level in the third quarter of the year. Con-
fidence began to fall sharply in the fourth quarter of 2000, well before
the cyclical peak in March 2001, but the indexes stabilized at relatively
high levels in the spring and summer. Because the declines in confi-
dence started from such high levels, the indexes were above their histor-
ical averages even in the third quarter of 2001.4
Some observers were also concerned in early 2001 about the unusu-
ally large gap between the expectations and current-conditions indexes
from the Conference Board survey. For example, the business press
prominently reported this large gap and pondered its implications for
the economic outlook (Ip, Morris). The gap equals the Conference
Board’s expectations index minus its current-conditions index. The
Chart 1
CONFERENCE BOARD AND MICHIGAN INDEXES
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Conference Board’s expectations index dropped much more sharply
than the current-conditions component, creating a record divergence
between the two components in the first quarter of 2001 (Chart 2). The
gap narrowed over the last three quarters of 2001 but remained large
by historical standards. However, the Conference Board gap essentially
closed in the first quarter of 2002. In contrast, the gap between the
expectations and current-conditions indexes from the Michigan survey
was never unusually large in 2001.5
The consumer confidence indexes fell below their historical averages
in the fall of 2001 because of a deteriorating economic situation and the
terrorist attacks on  September 11.  The  Conference Board’s index
plunged 17.0 points from August to September, the largest drop since
1990, while the Michigan index fell 9.7 points. Although the events of
September 11 may have lowered consumer confidence, the indexes
probably would have declined substantially even without the terrorist
Chart 2
CONFERENCE BOARD GAP
Note: The gap equals the Conference Board's expectations subindex minus its curent conditions
subindex.
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attacks. The University of Michigan reported that the mid-September
value of its index declined by nearly 8 points even though it included
only responses collected before the attacks. Apparently, weaker eco-
nomic indicators, such as a large increase in the unemployment rate in
August, also reduced consumer confidence in September.
Even though anthrax-contaminated mail and the military actions in
Afghanistan kept fears of terrorism alive, consumer confidence proved to
be resilient. Both indexes of consumer confidence began to recover before
the end of 2001. Although the fourth-quarter average for the Michigan
index was well below its third-quarter value because of the sharp decline
in September, monthly values for the Michigan index actually rose
slightly for each month in the final quarter of 2001. The Conference
Board index declined further in October and November, but turned
upward in December.6 As The New York T i m e slater observed, Americans
“emerged from the nation’s recent turmoil far more optimistic than after
any other economic downturn in a generation (Leonhardt).”
II. CONSUMER CONFIDENCE
AND ECONOMIC FORECASTS
Consumer confidence is a natural indicator for analysts and policy-
makers to monitor in times of turbulence. With consumer spending
equal to roughly two-thirds of real GDP, confidence-related shifts in
consumption could outweigh the more direct economic losses from Sep-
tember 11. But do fluctuations in consumer confidence really help to
predict economic variables of interest, such as real GDP or consump-
tion? One way to gauge the predictive value of consumer confidence
measures is to examine whether the indexes were able to improve eco-
nomic forecasts in  the  past.  This  section briefly surveys  previous
research and then presents some additional evidence for 1995–2001.
Previous research
Previous studies have often found that consumer confidence indexes
produced, at best, small improvements in forecast accuracy.7 For exam-
ple, in the early 1990s, Leeper argued that researchers should assess the
information content of consumer confidence measures relative to readilyECONOMIC REVIEW  • SECOND QUARTER 2002 7
available financial market indicators, such as stock prices or interest
rates. He focused on whether these variables helped predict two monthly
measures, industrial output and the unemployment rate. When financial
market indicators were included in the information set, Leeper found
“the empirical grounds for viewing attitudes as having an important
independent influence appear to be somewhat barren.” Fuhrer reached a
slightly more favorable conclusion, finding that consumer confidence
produced only small improvements in forecast accuracy but the predic-
tive power was “statistically significant and thus reliable.”
A more recent study by Bram and Ludvigson compared the fore-
casting power of the Conference Board and Michigan indexes. Pr e v i o u s
studies focused mostly on the Michigan index, which is the oldest index
of this type and provides the longest history for researchers to study.
Bram and Ludvigson found that the Conference Board’s measures had
“economically and statistically significant explanatory power for several
spending categories,” but the Michigan measures had much weaker
forecasting power.
Most recently, Howrey examined the value of the Michigan index in
forecasting the probability of a recession and predicting personal con-
sumption expenditures. Howrey concluded that the Michigan index
produced a discernible improvement in accuracy when forecasting the
probability of recession. However, the index produced only a small
improvement in forecast accuracy for quarterly consumption expendi-
tures. Moreover, once the values of personal consumption and dispos-
able  income  were  known  for the  first  month  of  the quarter,  the
statistical significance of the Michigan index disappeared. An important
limitation of Howrey’s study is that the conclusions were based prima-
rily on a statistical method that used more information than actual fore-
casters would have had available.8 In forecasting exercises that make
more realistic assumptions about the available information, confidence
indexes are sometimes found to produce smaller improvements in fore-
cast accuracy or even to worsen forecasting performance.8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Additional evidence
Forecasting exercises for 1995–2001 provide additional empirical
evidence that consumer confidence indexes have limited value in pre-
dicting economic fluctuations. These results reflect more recent eco-
nomic observations, which were not available for previous studies of
consumer confidence. Consistent with many of the previous studies,
h o w e v e r, these results show that the improvement in forecast accuracy
is small, at best, if other readily available macroeconomic information is
already taken into account.
The forecasting exercises follow Leeper’s approach in examining
whether confidence helps predict broader fluctuations in economic
a c t i v i t y. Thus, this analysis predicts real GDP growth and the unem-
ployment rate. Although Leeper examined industrial production, real
GDP growth is a more natural output measure when working with
quarterly statistics. In addition, the analysis considers forecasts of
growth in consumer spending on durable goods, such as autos and
appliances, because there seems to be a natural link between consumer
confidence and consumer spending. However, these results are not
reported here because the confidence measures did not improve fore-
casts of consumer durables spending for 1995–2001.
The remainder of this section evaluates the confidence measures by
comparing the predictive accuracy of simple statistical models with and
without the consumer confidence indexes. For example, the analysis
produced forecasts of real GDP growth based on past real GDP growth,
past changes in the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock price index, and past
CPI inflation. Additional forecasts were then made including past val-
ues of the Michigan index, the Conference Board index, or one of their
major subindexes with the other explanatory variables. Given the recent
attention to the gap between the expectations and current-conditions
subindexes from the Conference Board survey, this measure and a com-
parable “gap” from the Michigan survey were also used as possible
explanatory variables. The models used quarterly data and included four
lagged values of each explanatory variable.
The forecasting exercises followed a “recursive” procedure in which
the statistical models were updated as new economic information
became available. This approach simulated the situation that wouldECONOMIC REVIEW  • SECOND QUARTER 2002 9
have faced actual economic forecasters.9 For example, forecasters at the
beginning of 1995 would not have been able to use observations for
1995 to 2001 to estimate their models. As a result, this exercise esti-
mated the statistical models over the period from 1967 to 1994. Fo r e-
casts were then generated for the first quarter of 1995, and the actual
values for that quarter were used to calculate the forecast errors. To gen-
erate a forecast for the second quarter of 1995, the models were re-esti-
mated with the actual values for the first quarter of 1995 added to the
sample. New one-period-ahead forecasts were then generated for the
second quarter of 1995, with and without the confidence measures, and
a new set of forecast errors was computed.
The predictive accuracy of the different models was compared using
the root mean squared errors of their forecasts from the first quarter of
1995 to the fourth of 2001. To compute the root mean squared error,
the forecast errors in each period were squared to keep negative errors
from canceling out positive errors and to weight large forecasting errors
more heavily than small ones. The average of these errors for a given
forecast horizon was computed over 1995–2001, and then the square
root of this average was taken. A larger root mean squared error implies
the model is doing a worse job, on average, of predicting the given eco-
nomic variable.
Table 1 presents the root mean squared errors for the forecasts of
real GDP growth and the unemployment rate. The first line gives the
root mean squared forecast errors for models with no confidence index.
The remaining lines give results for models including the Conference
Board and Michigan indexes, as well as their major subindexes and the
gaps between the expectations and current-conditions components.
When including a confidence measure reduced the forecast error, Ta b l e
1 shows the corresponding root mean squared error in bold type. Fo r
example, adding the Conference Board’s current-conditions index to the
model of real GDP growth reduced the forecast error to 2.1951 from
2.2760 in the model without a confidence index.
Both the Conference Board and Michigan measures sometimes
improved forecasts of real GDP growth and the unemployment rate,
but the reductions in forecast errors generally seem small.1 0 This finding
is true not only for the overall indexes but also for the expectations and
current-conditions subindexes. These results also provide some support10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
for the practice of monitoring the gaps between the expectations and
current-conditions subindexes. In particular, the Conference Board gap
produced the biggest improvement of any confidence measure for the
real  GDP  growth  forecasts.  Although  the  Michigan  gap  did  not
improve real GDP forecasts, this measure did slightly reduce average
errors in forecasting the unemployment rate.
DID ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OR TERRORISM LOWER
CONFIDENCE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11?
The small improvements in forecast accuracy from the confidence
variables suggest that these indexes normally contain relatively little
information that is not available from other indicators. There might,
h o w e v e r, be special circumstances when confidence indexes contain
unique information that is not readily available from other sources.
Were the months immediately after September 11 such a period? This
section shows that the consumer confidence indexes maintained a fairly
Table 1
ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERRORS
(1-quarter-ahead forecasts)












Note: Numbers are root mean square errors for predictions over 1995–2001.
Bold type indicates that including the consumer confidence measure reduced the forecast error.ECONOMIC REVIEW  • SECOND QUARTER 2002 11
normal relationship to other economic indicators after the terrorist
attacks. As a result, the indexes do not seem to have contained unique
information related to the September 11 attacks.
Relation to economic indicators
Previous research showed that simple statistical models explain a
large part of the variation in the consumer confidence indexes (Fu h r e r,
Lovell, Throop). These studies did not, however, produce complete
agreement about the most relevant explanatory variables or the proper
form for the statistical model. Given the large set of indicators that
might affect consumer confidence and the loose links between the con-
fidence measures and conventional economic theory, discovering the
best model of consumer confidence is beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, the decline in consumer confidence before the terror-
ist attacks appears to have been consistent with changes in major
macroeconomic indicators. For example, weaker labor market condi-
tions probably contributed somewhat to the decline in consumer confi-
dence. Although unemployment remained low by past standards, the
civilian unemployment rate rose slightly from 4.0 percent in 2000 to
4.4 percent in the first half of 2001. Moreover, the unexpectedly large
rise in the unemployment rate from 4.4 percent in July 2001 to 4.9 per-
cent in August preceded the sharp decline in consumer confidence in
the first part of September.
Higher consumer price inflation may also have contributed to the
decline in confidence. Consumer price inflation rose from 1.5 percent in
1999 to roughly 3.5 percent annually in 2000 and the first half of 2001.
The major cause of the higher inflation was rising energy prices. Cold
winter weather, low natural gas inventories, and reduced OPEC produc-
tion of crude oil caused large spikes in energy prices. Core CPI inflation,
which excludes the more volatile food and energy prices, was also
slightly higher at the end of 2000.1 1
Sharp drops in stock prices were another economically important
and highly publicized factor that may have lowered consumer confi-
dence. Large-company stock prices, measured by the Standard and
Poor’s 500 stock price index, peaked in the third quarter of 2000, while
the technology-heavy NASDAQ index peaked in the first quarter of12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
2000. Lower stock prices directly decreased household wealth, reducing
the resources available to finance future consumption. Lower wealth
may have made households more pessimistic about their future financial
situations, a question asked directly by the Michigan survey.1 2 In addi-
tion, lower stock prices may have made households more pessimistic
about future business  and  employment conditions, affecting their
responses to questions in both surveys.
Simple empirical models incorporating these indicators explain a
large part of the variation in the consumer confidence indexes. Both the
Conference Board index and the Michigan index are explained fairly
well by four lagged values of the unemployment rate, four lagged val-
ues of CPI inflation, and four lagged values of the percentage change in
the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock price index (appendix). Even more of
the variation in the confidence indexes can be explained by including
four lagged values of the confidence measure itself to capture the effect
of other economic indicators that were omitted from the equations but
may have influenced consumer confidence historically.1 3 Such models
can explain nearly 90 percent of the variation in the Conference Board
and Michigan indexes over time.
The role of unique events
Although these simple models explain most of the variation in con-
sumer confidence from 1967 to 2001, some fluctuations remain unex-
plained. More sophisticated models with additional macroeconomic
indicators might explain even more of the variation, but some of the
fluctuations in confidence may also have been due to unique and largely
unexpected events. According to Richard Curtin, director of the Univer-
sity of Michigan’s consumer survey, “the sharpest changes in consumer
expectations have been associated with the rapid development of unex-
pected events whose implications are difficult to assess.” Curtin notes
that such rapid changes may produce a “disabling sense of uncertainty
and disengagement.”
History provides some perspective on the possible effects of the Sep-
tember 11 attacks. Although there is no exact historical precedent for
September 11, a somewhat similar situation was the Persian Gulf Wa r,
which started when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and endedECONOMIC REVIEW  • SECOND QUARTER 2002 13
with a cease-fire agreement in March 1991. Previous research found that
the decline in confidence associated with the Persian Gulf War helped
predict subsequent weakness in consumer spending (Garner, Throop).
Because many other macroeconomic indicators did not immediately
reflect the Gulf Wa r, consumer confidence may have been useful to fore-
casters at the time. The Persian Gulf crisis differed from the recent
attacks in several respects, however. For example, the Persian Gulf crisis
interrupted world oil production and sharply raised the energy prices fac-
ing U.S. households, while the terrorist attacks were followed initially by
declining world oil prices. Also, unlike September 11, the Persian Gulf
War involved no direct attacks on the U.S. homeland.1 4
Other recent terrorist attacks on U.S. soil resulted in less loss of life
and much smaller economic disruptions than the attacks on September
11. Although the bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993
tragically killed six people, the losses were not great enough to have
noticeable macroeconomic effects. The bombing of the Murrah Fe d e r a l
Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 produced a large loss of
human life, but the bomb blast did not greatly disrupt economic activ-
ity outside of Oklahoma City, and the quick capture of the perpetrators
lowered fears of additional attacks. In contrast, the attacks on Septem-
ber 11 caused massive human and economic losses, and the interrup-
tions to transportation and communication damaged the travel industry
and interfered with a wide range of other business activities nationally
and internationally. Moreover, the recent attacks have produced linger-
ing concerns about future terrorist acts.
The effects of these events can be evaluated empirically by extend-
ing the simple regression models from the previous subsection. Those
models related consumer confidence to lagged values of the unemploy-
ment rate, CPI inflation, stock prices and the confidence index. Special
“ d u m m y” variables are added to the models to represent possible tem-
porary influences from the Persian Gulf Wa r, the World Trade Center
bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the September 11 attacks.
Only the Persian Gulf War had a clear effect on consumer confi-
dence after controlling for the macroeconomic indicators. Table 2
reports whether the dummy variables representing these events were
statistically significant in the regression equations for the Conference
Board and Michigan indexes. The numbers in the table are marginal14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
significance levels, which are usually interpreted as indicating statistical
significance when the number is less than 0.05. The World Trade Cen-
ter and Oklahoma City bombings do not approach statistical signifi-
cance, suggesting that households did not view these events as having
widespread economic significance despite their political and human
impacts. The Persian Gulf Wa r, however, had a statistically significant
effect, lowering the consumer confidence indexes from the third quarter
of 1990 through the first quarter of 1991. Based on coefficient esti-
mates reported in the appendix, the Persian Gulf War reduced the Con-
ference Board index by about 14 points and the Michigan index by
about 8 points.
The last line of Table 2 confirms the surprising resilience of con-
sumers after the September 11 attacks. For both indexes, a dummy
variable for the fourth quarter of 2001 is not statistically significant,
although the marginal significance level of 0.13 for the Conference
Board index is small enough that many analysts would not completely
dismiss the view that the terrorist attacks lowered consumer confidence.
But the fourth-quarter decline in consumer confidence can largely be
attributed to worsening economic conditions in the third quarter and
e a r l i e r. The fourth-quarter movements of the confidence indexes appar-
ently did not contain much information on the economic impact of Sep-
tember 11.
Table 2
EFFECTS OF PAST UNIQUE EVENTS ON CONFIDENCE
Event Conference Board Michigan
1993 World Trade Center  .39 .46
bombing
Oklahoma City bombing .72 .95
Persian Gulf War .01 .01
September 11 .13 .57
Note: The table reports marginal significance levels for the dummy variables representing these
events.Values lower than 0.05 indicate statistical significance.ECONOMIC REVIEW  • SECOND QUARTER 2002 15
The fact that consumer confidence measures maintained a fairly
normal relationship with macroeconomic indicators should, however,
have been somewhat reassuring to economic analysts and policymakers.
Had confidence declined more sharply than the historical relationship
implied, it might have suggested a more severe economic contraction
than actually occurred. In this sense, the resilience of consumer confi-
dence indexes may have contained useful information for economists
and policymakers. As a result, economists should track movements in
consumer confidence relative to the predictions of a simple statistical
model to better judge the impact of unique events, such as wars or ter-
rorist acts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the terrorist attacks on September 11 inflicted severe
human and economic losses, the American consumer proved to be sur-
prisingly resilient. Both the Conference Board and Michigan indexes of
consumer confidence started to recover by the end of 2001. These
indexes seem to have maintained a fairly normal relationship to other
economic indicators. Thus, the decline of consumer confidence in the
fourth quarter of 2001 was due mostly to weaker economic conditions in
the previous quarters and not to the September 11 attacks. Under the
circumstances, consumer confidence did not contain much new informa-
tion for economic analysts and policymakers and could be expected to
improve their forecasts only slightly. But the resilience of consumer con-
fidence after September 11 did offer some reassurance that the terrorist
attacks would not have devastating economic consequences.16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
SURVEY QUESTIONS
The five main questions in the consumer confidence surveys are pre-
sented below. For additional methodological details, see the Conference Board and
Survey Research Center websites in the references.
Conference Board survey questions
Present situation
1. How would you rate present general business conditions in your area?
[good/normal/bad]
2. What would you say about available jobs in your area right now? [plenti-
ful/not so many/hard to get]
Expectations
3. Six months from now, do you think business conditions in your area will be
[better/same/worse]
4. Six months from now, do you think there will be [more/same/fewer] jobs
available in your area?
5. How would you guess your total family income to be six months from
now? [higher/same/lower]
University of Michigan survey questions
Present situation
1. We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days.
Would you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or
worse off financially than you were a year ago?
2. About the big things people buy for their homes—such as furniture, a
refrigerator, stove, television, and things like that. Generally speaking,
do you think now is a good or bad time for people to buy major house-
hold items?
Expectations
3. Now looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you (and your
family living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just
about the same as now?
4. Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you
think that during the next 12 months we’ll have good times financially,
or bad times, or what?
5. Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as
a whole we’ll have continuous good times during the next five years or
so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depres-
sion, or what?ECONOMIC REVIEW  • SECOND QUARTER 2002 17
APPENDIX
STATISTICAL MODELS OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE
To examine the effect of economic indicators and unique events on
the consumer confidence indexes, regression equations were estimated
relating the confidence index in period t to a constant term and lagged
values of consumer price inflation, the civilian unemployment rate,
changes in the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock price index, and lagged
values of the confidence index. The lagged variables were for periods t - 1
to t - 4. The unemployment rate was not always statistically significant in
these regressions but was retained in the reported results because past
studies have often found a relationship between unemployment and
consumer confidence.
Dummy variables were included for the unique events. The dummy
variable for 1993 World Trade Center bombing took the value 1 for the
first quarter of 1993 and 0 for all other dates. Likewise, the dummy for
the Oklahoma City bombing equaled 1 for the second quarter of 1995
and 0 for all other dates. The Persian Gulf War variable equaled 1 from
the third quarter of 1990 through the first quarter of 1991 and 0 other-
wise, and the September 11 dummy variable equaled 1 for the fourth
quarter of 2001 and 0 otherwise. This definition of the September 11
dummy variable seems reasonable at this writing, but future researchers
may wish to examine whether the September 11 attacks had longer
lasting effects.
Table A1 presents some results for the equations with the Pe r s i a n
Gulf War dummy variable included. As reported in Table 2, the Pe r s i a n
Gulf War variable was the only dummy variable to be statistically signif-
icant. The equations were estimated over the period from the first quar-
ter of 1968 to the fourth quarter of 2001. The sample starts in 1968 to
allow for the four lagged quarterly values of confidence. The sum of the
four lagged CPI inflation variables is reported rather than the coefficients
on each lag, and the same is true for the unemployment rate, the change
in stock prices, and the lagged consumer confidence index. Marginal sig-
nificance levels are given below the estimated coefficients.18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Appendix Table
Explanatory variable Conference Board Michigan
Constant 10.55 14.08
(.34) (.15)
CPI inflation -.50 -.60
(.12) (.02)
Unemployment rate .24 .50
(.79) (.23)
Stock prices .13 .08
(.03) (.03)
Lagged confidence .89 .83
(.00) (.00)
Persian Gulf War -14.19 -7.81
(.01) (.01)
R2 .89 .88ECONOMIC REVIEW  • SECOND QUARTER 2002 19
ENDNOTES
1 The Michigan survey does ask about household expectations for unemploy-
ment and family income over the next 12 months, but responses to these questions
are not used in computing the Michigan index.
2 The Conference Board index is not available before 1967. The Conference
Board survey was conducted bimonthly from 1967 to the second quarter of 1977.
Linear interpolation was used to fill the missing months for the Conference Board
index, and the monthly data were then averaged to produce a quarterly series.
3 The National Bureau of Economic Research determined that the U.S. econ-
omy reached a cyclical peak in March 2001. The NBER defines a recession as “a
period of significant decline in total output, income, employment, and trade, usu-
ally lasting from six months to a year, and marked by widespread contractions in
many sectors of the economy.” That is, the NBER does not define a recession as
two or more consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP . As of this writing, the
NBER had not determined the date for the latest cyclical trough. The shading in
the charts assumes the recession continued through the first quarter of 2002. Fo r
more information on the NBER dating procedure and the dates of past cyclical
turning points, see the NBER website in the references.
4 The Conference Board index stood at 109.1 in the third quarter of 2001,
still above its historical average of 98.8 since 1967. The Michigan index was 88.6
in the third quarter of 2001, slightly above its average of 86.2 over the same
p e r i o d .
5 The Conference Board gap was –90.6 in the first quarter of 2001, far below
the average of –5.5. In contrast, the Michigan gap was –21.9 compared with an
average of –16.5 for 1967-2001. Although the Conference Board gap narrowed in
2001, it remained well below its historical average at year’s end.
6 In the fourth quarter of 2001, the Michigan index slipped to 85.1 from the
third-quarter value of 88.6, while the Conference Board index fell to 88.0 from a
previous value of 109.1.
7 These studies focused on measures of consumer confidence for the United
States. Santero and Westerlund examined the predictive usefulness of business and
consumer surveys for a broader set of countries, finding that the relationship varies
considerably from country to country. For the United States, this study concluded
that consumer confidence helped predict real GDP and industrial production but
not real private consumption.
Studies of predictive usefulness have relied almost entirely on macroeconomic
statistics. Souleles, however, examined the predictive usefulness of the Michigan
survey at the household level. Although he found that households are biased and
make inefficient use of available information, consumer confidence did help to
forecast future household consumption even after controlling for lagged consump-
tion and macroeconomic indicators.
8 In particular, many of the conclusions are based on “within-sample” fore-
casting exercises, which assume that the forecaster used observations for the entire
sample period to estimate the coefficients of the statistical model. In practice, a
forecaster at a particular date within that period would not have had any observa-
tions after that date to use in estimating a model. The alternative is “out-of- s a m-20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ple” forecasting in which the coefficients are estimated with observations up to a
certain date and those coefficients are then used to produce forecasts for subse-
quent periods that are not yet observed.
9 This procedure does not exactly recreate the way that actual forecasters
would have made predictions in the past, however. For example, this study used
revised data for real GDP . Croushore and Stark argued that use of “real-time” data,
meaning the actual data from statistical releases available to forecasters at the
time, can sometimes change the empirical results. For the unemployment rate,
revisions are so trivial that the real-time data issue should not be a concern.
1 0 Tests of equal forecast accuracy find that some of the reductions in forecast
errors are statistically significant and some are not.
1 1 H o w e v e r, ten-year inflation expectations were essentially steady at a 2.50
percent rate from 2000 through the first quarter of 2002 according to the Fe d e r a l
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional F o r e c a s t e r s .
1 2 The Conference Board survey also asks households about their expectations
for total family income six months in the future. It is unclear whether survey
respondents would view a change in stock market wealth as affecting their “total
family income” since they might associate this term mostly with wages and
s a l a r i e s .
1 3 The lagged confidence values also may represent the gradual adjustment of
household beliefs to incoming economic information. George Katona, the creator
of the Michigan index, believed that consumer expectations follow a slow social
learning process. As a result, “when a trend of changed expectations is established,
it will be reversed only slowly and gradually—unless major unexpected develop-
ments take place (Katona, p. 82).”
1 4 Another natural historical comparison might be the Cuban missile crisis in
1962, which occurred near U.S. shores and involved potential use of nuclear
weapons. However, the Conference Board survey did not exist in 1962, and the
Michigan survey was conducted on a quarterly basis at the time. The Michigan
index is available for August and November of 1962, making it difficult to detect
any effects from a crisis that took place largely in the last half of October 1962.ECONOMIC REVIEW  • SECOND QUARTER 2002 21
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